The Reality of Miracles

A Refutation of Antony Flew’s Views

By Malachi

Perhaps the most forceful and persuasive opponent toward the miraculous since David Hume is the British philosopher and atheist, Antony Flew. Through his writings against miracles, Flew has influenced so many people, including many philosophers and theologians, that his views need to be considered and dealt with before using the miraculous as an apologetic for Christianity. Since much ink has been spilled by various thinkers against the miraculous and since many of the arguments have had a great force and plausibility, a section dealing with his key arguments seems appropriate. An evaluation of some of the background information about miracles seems much needed as well. However, to investigate and evaluate Flew’s arguments against the miraculous is no small feat. For this reason his arguments will be clearly articulated and then they will be criticized. To be more specific, his falsification principle and his argument against the miraculous will be critiqued. Next, a defense of Jesus’ resurrection will be offered in light of Flew’s critique against miracles. It will be argued that Jesus’ resurrection best explains three facts: Jesus’ tomb was found empty; various people experienced appearances of Jesus; and the belief in Jesus’ resurrection originated in an actual historical event. Lastly, a section will be given for some concluding thoughts on how true and authentic miracles can be differentiated from the false. All of this will be done in a balanced and systematic way and there will be an honest and sincere attempt to leave no stone unturned in refuting Antony Flew’s views.

Since the Enlightenment, belief in miracles has no longer been considered as having significant evidentiary power. It simply wasn’t possible that God could perform a miracle in that scientifically accurate and mathematically precise, Newtonian universe. Because God was conceived of as being all powerful, the question that inevitably arose in many of the minds of the Enlightenment was how could God have possibly created a world that needed miracles? After all, an all-powerful God could have created such a world. Having the very attribute of omniscience implied that God would know how to create a world with the properties and attributes to substance itself. Lastly, the very nature of God meant that God would have done this very thing because His love for creation would have insured in such a definitive and powerful way that a Newtonian world-machine would almost have been necessitated. Moreover, all the “evidence that pointed to a cosmic intelligence also served to promote belief in a Deity who master-minded the great creation but who took no personal interest in the petty affairs of men. It simply seemed incredible to think that God would intervene on this tiny planet on behalf of some people living in Judea.” 1 It is thus important to remember that the argument wasn’t over God’s existence, for this was challenged rarely, but over a metaphysical assumption and incredibility of the mere idea that a miracle could happen in light of the mathematical and scientific Newtonian universe that God had created. 2 Since the beginning of this mindset, some of the more important thinkers who have advanced arguments against miracles include Benedict de Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Alastair McKinnon, and Antony Flew. Instead of discussing all of their views individually, it will suffice to discuss them more in general terms because each of the arguments they forward in rejection of miracles assume as a rule that

[T]he evidence for the regular and repeatable is always greater than that for the irregular and singular. Science is based on uniform experience, not anomalies. Regularity is the basis of a scientific understanding. Therefore, science as such can never accept the miraculous. Thus, the principle of regularity seems to be the common thread of the anti- supernatural arguments. 3

This general view is still held today among the intelligentsia of the world and this anti-super-naturalistic worldview has also crept into the church. In effect, this anti-super-naturalistic worldview has had a significant impact on Biblical scholarship. Because this sentiment spread across the globe rather fast, even to Germany which was the birth place of New Testament scholarship, it was virtually inevitable that subsequently “German Rationalists of the late seventeenth/early eighteenth centuries were willing, indeed, sometimes eager, to grant the historicity of the event itself” 4 but simply refused to tolerate any type of supernatural causation in history or any such divine implications given to an alleged miracle. From the time of Gotthold Lessing and Immanuel Kant, the historical process has also been thought of as insufficient to give answers to faith. But because of their rejection of miracles, historians and scholars of the New Testament throughout the nineteenth century found themselves trying to explain Jesus’ resurrection in purely naturalistic terms. This gave way to many far-reaching and fantastic theories about Jesus’ resurrection. Some of these theories include the apparent death theory. This is often called the swoon theory and it states that Jesus didn’t actually die on the cross, but only appeared to die, or swoon. Later that day, Jesus was placed in the cold and damp tomb where he revived and eventually appeared to his disciples, leaving an empty tomb behind him. Another extravagant theory is the fraud/stolen body theory. This view states that the disciples conspired together by snatching Jesus’ body from the tomb and then proclaiming the resurrection. Various modifications abound for this theory. In some versions, the women, Jews, gardener, or even the Romans were thought to be the real culprits. The hallucination theory was also a theory postulated in the 19th century but later a consensus of New Testament scholars rejected it too. This theory simply stated that the disciples saw what they thought were literal, physical appearances of the risen Jesus but in fact, had seen nothing of the sort. This view has recently been resurrected by Gerd Ludemann 5 and even Antony Flew has considered it a possibility. Finally, the legend theory was the last of the great naturalistic hypotheses. It stated that the gospel stories and resurrection narratives were infiltrated by legendary stories and material as time progressed. The ironic thing about all the naturalistic theories was that there was somewhat of a consensus by the end of the 19th century that they were all faulty or failed to account for all the evidence. By not allowing even for the possibility of miracles in history, the seemingly miraculous events surrounding Jesus’ death, burial, empty tomb, and appearances were left unexplained. Theologians and historians weren’t ready to abandon their cherished religion just yet though.

In response to the nineteenth century’s failure to give an adequate naturalistic explanation for the resurrection, the twentieth century was more optimistic about the whole Jesus question. No more was it a serious obstacle to the theologian or critical historian of the late 19th century, and throughout much of the 20th century, to not believe in a resurrected Jesus because the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith were now seen as diametrically opposed to each other. It was no longer of concern whether Jesus’ resurrection actually occurred in a literal space and time event or not.

Things have changed dramatically though. Current New Testament scholarship and modern philosophical and theological thought on miracles have had something of a theistic renaissance. As for contemporary research investigating the historical Jesus, by far, “…the majority of New Testament scholars today—not conservative, not fundamentalists—concur with the facts of Jesus’ honorable burial, his empty tomb, his postmortem appearances, and the origin of the disciples’ belief in his resurrection. . . . [I]t is a surprising truth, not widely appreciated by non-specialists.” 6 Similarly, the modern conception of miracles as possible occurrences in history and identifiable in practicality has grown far more optimistic then once was the case. One prominent philosopher of religion has noted:

What is particularly interesting about the references theologians make to Kant or Hume is that most often we find the philosopher merely mentioned, but we rarely, if ever, see an account of precisely which arguments of his are supposed to have accomplished the alleged demolitions. . . . In fact, I must confess to never having seen in the writings of any contemporary theologian the exposition of a single argument from either Hume or Kant, or any other historical figure for that matter, which comes anywhere near to demolishing…historical Christian doctrine, or…theological realism.” 7

It should be emphasized that while a debate among philosophers and theologians regarding the possibility of miracles still rages in scholarly literature and while a similar debate among New Testament scholars about the historical Jesus still takes front stage, the tide has definitely changed. However, some contemporary philosophers and other intellectuals still refuse to believe that miracles are possible or believable. One such philosopher is Antony Flew. 8 Flew has published widely in the area of philosophical theology and his critique of miracles and his famous falsification principle are highly sophisticated and powerful arguments that need to be examined in their own light to be grasped fully. The rest of this paper will investigate Flew’s philosophy and thought.

In 1950, Antony Flew published a paper 9 that dealt with the notion that for a statement to be a true statement, it must have the possibility of being false. That is, if proposition P contains any truth value, then it must have the possibility of being false. The statement

it is warm outside today” must, Flew contends, have the possibility of not being warm outside that day. This type of argument is intended to be a critique of the very notion of God. For the question that Flew has proposed to the theist from his falsification principle reveals itself in clear sight: “[W]hat would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God? 10

Flew starts his thesis with a parable: “[O]nce upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in the jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers and many weeds.” The tale continues when

[O]ne explorer says: ‘Some gardener must tend this plot.’ The other disagrees: ‘There is no gardener.’ So they pitch their tents and set a watch. No gardener is ever seen. ‘But perhaps he is an invisible gardener.’ So they set up a barbed-wire fence. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds. (For they remember how H.G. Wells’ The Invisible Man could be both smelt and touched though he could not be seen).

Flew’s famous parable continues:

[B]ut no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever betray an invisible climber. The bloodhounds never give cry. Yet the Believer is not convinced: ‘But there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes no sound, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden which he loves.’

Finally, the shroud over the Believer’s eyes has been taken off and the veil torn. The parable continues: “At last the Skeptic despairs: ‘But what remains of your original assertion? Just how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?’” 11 Such a powerful critique deserves serious evaluation.

By extrapolating the situation with the gardener and the skeptic to theistic belief, it seems that Flew’s argument has a ring of plausibility. Flew is certainly right that sometimes “…it often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable event or series of events the occurrences of which would be admitted by sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for conceding ‘There was a God after all’ or ‘God does not really love us then.’” 12 In other words, when does the theist reach a point when his explanation for some occurrence or phenomena needs to be changed? Flew asks a question near the end of his article on falsification that needs to be considered. He states, “[S]omeone tells us that God loves us as a father loves his children. We are reassured. But then we see a child dying of inoperable cancer of the throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but his Heavenly Father reveals no obvious sign of concern.” 13 Why acknowledge God’s love for humanity in the light of such gratuitous evil? Only by the theist qualifying what God’s love is like that

God’s love is ‘not a merely human love’ or it is ‘an inscrutable love’, perhaps—and we realize that such sufferings are quite compatible with the truths of the assertion that ‘God loves us a father (but, of course,…)’. We are reassured again. But then, perhaps we ask: what is this assurance of God’s (appropriately qualified) love worth; what is this apparent guarantee really a guarantee against? Just what would have to happen, not merely (morally and wrongly) to tempt but also (logically and rightly) to entitle us, to say ‘God does not love us’ or even ‘God does not exist’? 14

These questions are of the utmost importance for the theist and Flew’s arguments need to be replied to and exposed for what they truly are. Thus, in response to Flew’s falsification principle, the proponent of the miraculous has a number of possible avenues to use in reply. The rest of this section will attempt to delineate the main avenues of response that the theist can take. The first critique is that the very falsification principle that Flew uses to critique belief in God, or theological utterances and assertions, to use his terminology, is self-defeating. But assuming that all statements that assert something must have the possibility of being false for them to be true, leaves only two options open. The options are either that 1) the falsification principle is exempt from its very criteria, or 2) the falsification fails its own test. Whichever option is chosen is doomed to failure. Option one stipulates that the falsification principle is something like a necessary truth. But isn’t this ironic, for theists have always thought this about God. Another objection to 1) is that it seems improbable that there could be a notion of truth, much less necessary truths, if God didn’t actually exist to act as an ontological anchor point for which immaterial realities such as propositions could derive their meaning. It doesn’t seem plausible that a naturalistic universe could give truth value because it operates by evolutionary processes over time by chance. Truth doesn’t evolve though. Also, the parable of the gardener indicates that utterances and talk about God are meaningless because of a child getting cancer. But he derives his notion of certain particulars being evil by a priori background knowledge that God wouldn’t allow evil in the world. This can be answered by Alvin Plantinga’s free-will defense. Moreover, if atheism appeals to some sort of background knowledge, then the theist can also do so, by giving arguments for God’s existence and so forth. As for option 2), that the falsification fails its own test by not meeting its very criteria, this would show that Flew’s objections to theological utterances or God talk can possibly have cognitive value which corresponds to a real state of events. The statement that God loves Antony Flew or that God is good would, it seems, not be stripped of its cognitive truth value and meaning. From this the theist can, again, appeal to background knowledge. This method could thus show that miracles by extension have a higher initial probability.

One last thing needs to be said before leaving this section. Flew earlier claimed that it often seems as if there is no conceivable event or series of events that would suffice a denial of God’s existence in the believer’s mind. As was discussed already, it is possible that God necessarily exists. In that case, God’s existence would be similar to a triangle’s existence, or the laws of logic, or numbers’ existence. These are all immaterial realities and no evidence or qualification is needed for a person to use them as revealing truth or corresponding to reality. One could also split Flew’s falsification principle and grant that for something to be believed or intelligible that it must be able to be falsified in principle. The theist could grant this argument and then offer grounds or parameters in which God would be falsified. 15

An extended discussion has been given in response to Flew’s famous falsification principle. After his argument was clearly articulated, it was criticized extensively. Next, the probability of identifying miracles will be laid out and then criticized. 16

Flew’s famous argument against miracles has been heralded by many as giving the death-blow against belief in miracles. Having studied Hume extensively and having himself stand at the forefront of the modern 17 atheistic movement against miracles, Flew has attempted single-handedly to close the door on the mere possibility of having “good reasons for belief in the miraculous.” 18 In full awareness that Hume’s argument falls short of its goals 19 in demonstrating that miracles are impossible, Flew has sought to rework and revamp the argument. However, instead of arguing from the uniformity of nature, as Hume did, Flew argues from the uncertainly of the laws of nature that miracles are un-identifiable and can’t be used as any type of evidence for religion. Flew notes about Hume

[A]ll of this [Flew’s] argumentation, although both relevant and (in spirit at least) thoroughly Humean, has little in common with the line of argument which Hume chose to develop in the section Of Miracles. Although this line of argument is equally methodological, it treats the question of miracles as it arises in the field of history rather than as it might infringe upon natural science. 20

By an updated version of Hume’s argument, Flew hopes to undermine belief in the miraculous. Indeed,

[T]he spokesman for the occurrence of the miraculous faces a dilemma that arises from the very essence of the concept he espouses. It is tempting, but wrong, for the believer in the miraculous to think that he can afford to gloat over any little local difficulties and embarrassments which may from time to time beset the forward march of science. But insofar as a miracle involves an alleged overriding of a law of nature, he too is committed to showing the subsistence of a natural order. 21

On one hand, the proponent of the miraculous faces the dilemma of holding to 1) nature is uniform, and 2) there are genuine exceptions to nature; or holding to 1) miracles are simply incredible and unbelievable and thus subject to Hume’s critique, which would 2) make stories of the miraculous arbitrary and would also make miracles unidentifiable. Little refuge is left for the proponent of the miraculous to escape. Neither of these alternatives seems very hopeful. Flew takes up the second horn of this conundrum. Miracles may still be possible in theory but in practice they can’t be identified. Ironically, “…it is only and precisely by presuming that the laws that hold today held in the past and by employing as canons all our knowledge—or presumed knowledge—of what is probable or improbable, possible or impossible, that we can rationally construct our account of what actually happened.” 22 Towards the end of Miracles, Flew, almost definitely smiling at the revolutionary dilemma the proponent of the miraculous now finds himself in after drawing out the argument against the miraculous, says, “[P]erhaps one might develop some defensible system of rational theology which would provide criteria both for identifying particular occurrences as miraculous and for separating the true miracle stories from the false.” 23 I think Flew is far too optimistic here.

Much can be said in response to Flew’s attack on miracles. In fact,

Flew’s view also is subject to the very criticisms Flew makes of theists, for it is not an un-falsifiable position. No matter what state of affairs occurs, even a resurrection, Flew (contrary even to Hume’s claims) would be obligated to deny that it was a miracle. And no event in the world would falsify naturalism. For the deck is stacked so that the evidence always weighs more heavily for anti-super-naturalism than against it. 24

Even supposing that Flew believes some sort of historical investigating is necessary to know that miracles have or haven’t occurred, he still must presume some sort of intuitive a priori knowledge in holding that the past must conform to the present. What is the thing he is presuming, you ask? The answer is that he’s presuming that his senses give reliable information about the external world. But this is an unjustifiable presumption. Only by presuming that God exists can one hold that our sense perceptions are reliable or even knowledge itself is possible. Why? The answer is because if God does not exist, then human reason, understanding, and logical inferences would be rooted and based in a meaningless universe that has evolved over time purely by chance. How can something intelligible come from something that is unintelligible? Flew does not give an answer to this dilemma in any of the literature. Furthermore, what we know as probable or improbable can’t even be assessed without having something to anchor knowledge in. We have already seen that knowledge and logic have to be anchored in something intelligent for it to produce something intelligent. Also, it has to be anchored in something that transcends itself. But moreover, when Flew refers to things being probable, improbable, possible, or impossible, what does he mean? We may certainly ask, probable, improbable, possible, and impossible to what? Flew’s answer to this question is it’s probable, given that the universe exists. But the universe is a meaningless by-product of chance. Only by presuming God’s existence do notions such as probable, possible, impossible, and improbable have inherent cognitive meaning.

But is a miracle really un-identifiable? I think not. Before further discussion of miracles, the term needs to be defined. Fortunately, however, Flew has done this himself. He explains that a miracle is “a term that has been variously understood, but is most commonly taken to mean an act that manifests divine power through the suspension or alteration of the normal working laws of nature.” 25 If miracles were un-definable, then the proponent of the miraculous would have a much harder, if not insurmountable, problem to solve. In that case, miracles really couldn’t be identified. This isn’t the case though, for a miracle could possibly be identified a number of ways, not merely by a definition. By its very nature, a miracle must be a singular event, be unique, occur extremely rarely, be powerful, and have moral significance. If miracles happened repeatedly and had eternal implications, this would increase their identifiability.

The theist has three ways to refute Flew’s argument against miracles. Indeed, “[O]ne way to reply to Flew is to claim that naturalists as well as super-naturalists are arguing in a circle. Anti-super-natural arguments presuppose naturalism. Thus, some theists simply claim that it is necessary to argue in a circle. All reason is circular.” 25 Various Christian apologists and theologians have held to this type of argument. 26. Another alternative for the theist to choose is that the natural laws that govern the universe are merely God’s normal and regular way of acting in history. A miracle would thus be God’s special action in history since it occurs rarely. A final alternative left open for the theist is by arguing for the existence of God by rational arguments. Some of these arguments would include the cosmological, 27 teleological, moral arguments, and even an argument that surely Flew would find ironic, an argument from the very miracle of Jesus’ resurrection. 28

With Flew’s falsification principle and argument against miracles out of the way, Flew’s criticisms of the resurrection will also be addressed with a defense of Jesus’ resurrection. Basically, the argument that Jesus’ resurrection constitutes a divine miracle in history has three historical facts associated with it. The three points are 1) that Jesus’ tomb was found empty by a group of his women followers, 2) various people experienced what they thought were appearances of Jesus, and 3) the belief in Jesus’ resurrection originated in an actual historical event. Of course, there is also circumstantial evidence for Jesus’ resurrection such as the day for worshiping changing to a Sunday from a Saturday, the inauguration of the church, and so on. It will be argued that the best explanation of these three historical facts is the resurrection of Jesus. The hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead would constitute a divine miracle, if it in fact could be established as being historically true. Throughout his written works on the resurrection, it is apparent that Flew believes the historical evidence found in the Biblical and extra-Biblical sources regarding Jesus’ resurrection can be falsified. By using Flew’s own falsification principle, this would mean that history can also verify Jesus’ resurrection. The following will be an extended apologetic for these three historical facts and Flew’s analysis and an explanation of the resurrection.

Flew seems to endorse the hallucination theory. This theory, however, has been severely criticized. 28 Flew writes about Jesus’ resurrection: “I suppose it would be right to say hallucination, insofar as they believed they were seeing something.” 29 At other times, Flew seems not to be the biggest fan of any naturalistic theory because “…it is a marginal case.” 30 It is noteworthy that Flew holds 1) that the New Testament has an abundance of manuscripts and textual support, 2) the naturalistic theories fail and are “rubbish,” 31 and the resurrection has 3) early eyewitness testimony. The resurrection of Jesus seems close at hand once these three facts are recognized. Some of these include the authenticity of an ancient creed that is located in 1 Corinthians 15:3-5. Here,

Paul is quoting an old Christian formula which he received and in turn passed on to his converts. According to Galatians 1:18, Paul was in Jerusalem three years after his conversion on a fact-finding mission, during which he conferred with Peter and James over a two week period, and he probably received the formula at this time, if not before. Since Paul was converted in AD 33, this means that the list of witnesses goes back to within the first five years after Jesus' death. Thus, it is idle to dismiss these appearances as legendary. We can try to explain them away as hallucinations if we wish, but we cannot deny they occurred. Paul's information makes it certain that on separate occasions various individuals and groups saw Jesus alive from the dead. 32

Gathering all the evidence in the gospels together with all the Biblical and non-Biblical sources and adding the 1 Corinthians 15 creed to the mix builds a rather impressive historical case for Jesus’ resurrection. These three facts will now be discussed.

Various pieces of evidence attest to the empty tomb of Jesus. A debate with Gerd Ludemann lists five reasons why the empty tomb is regarded as historical. 33 They include: the empty-tomb story is part of very old source material used by Mark; the old information transmitted by Paul in 1 Corinthians implies the fact of the empty tomb. Flew has said that the empty tomb is not mentioned in the creed of chapter fifteen of that book. But the words “[F]or I handed on to you as of first importance what I in turn had received: that Christ died for our sin in accordance with the scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve.” 34 Thus, the 1 Corinthians 15 creed in verses three through five imply the empty tomb. It would have been virtually meaningless for the Jews to understand that a person could be resurrected and that a body still lay in the tomb. Paul’s mentioning the phrase “then to the twelve” shows that there is early testimony that the disciples didn’t merely have singular hallucinations because groups of people saw the risen Jesus at the same time. But it needs to be emphasized that “…a resurrection without an empty grave would have been about as meaningful as a square circle.” 35 Craig mentions three other reasons for the empty tomb: the story is simple and lacks signs of legendary embellishment; the worthlessness of women’s testimony in first-century Palestine counts in favor of the women’s role in discovering the empty tomb; and the earliest Jewish allegation that the disciples stole Jesus’ body shows that the body was in fact missing from the tomb.

Since Flew didn’t criticize the empty tomb tradition in any detail, the appearances next need to be investigated. The ancient creed in 1 Corinthians again plays a crucial role in the veracity of the disciples’ reported testimony. Craig remarks on this in that with “…respect to the first supporting line of evidence, it is universally accepted on the basis of the early data of Paul’s tradition, as well as the apostle’s personal acquaintance with many of the people listed, that the disciples did experience postmortem appearances of Christ.” 36 A “second supporting line of evidence appeals again to the criterion of multiple attestations. The Gospels independently attest to postmortem appearances of Jesus, even to some of the same appearances found in Paul’s list.” 37 For example, Jesus appeared to Peter, which is recorded in Luke 24, and to the disciples, recorded in Matthew 28. Flew has constantly challenged the nature of the appearance tradition by claiming that the disciples’ appearances were of the same caliber as Paul’s experience of the risen Christ. Flew thinks this because “we have the earliest written document about appearances…” 38 in the 1 Corinthians 15 creed. However, to equate the disciples’ experiences of Jesus with Paul’s seems “far too facile. Certainly Paul did want to attribute to the appearance he witnessed the same significance that the appearances had for the disciples (1 Cor 9:1). But precisely for that reason we cannot infer that the earliest appearances were of the same character as Paul’s vision. Many in Corinth doubted Paul’s authorship…” 39 and this is probably why he put himself in the list of the appearances. It is especially noteworthy though that Paul includes himself at the very bottom of the list.

How did belief in the resurrection originate? A discussion of Christian origins seems appropriate. Flew doesn’t deal with the subject of how the disciples came to believe in the resurrection, but this is a very important subject. After the disciples had followed Jesus for approximately three years, their whole universe and existence must have been devastatingly painful. All their hopes and even their will to live which they thought were shattered and gone had been swallowed up by happiness at the sight of the risen Jesus. As C.D. Broad has said,

We have testimony to the effect that the disciples were exceedingly depressed at the time of the Crucifixion; that they had extremely little faith in the future; and that, after a certain time, this depression disappeared, and they believed that they had evidence that their Master had risen from the dead. Now knowing of these alleged facts is in the least odd or improbable, and we have therefore little ground for not accepting them on the testimony offered us. But having done this, we are faced with the problem of accounting for the facts which we have accepted. What caused the disciples to believe, contrary to their previous conviction, and in spite of their feeling of depression, that Christ had risen from the dead? Clearly, one explanation is that He actually had arisen. And this explanation accounts for the facts so well that we may at least say that the indirect evidence for the miracle is far and away stronger than the direct evidence. 40

The proponent of the miraculous need not be afraid of methodological naturalism which states that miracles are logically possible but the occurrence of one in reality would cast doubt on science and natural laws. This isn’t so. As one famous Christian apologist has said “[B]ut if we admit God, must we admit Miracle? Indeed, indeed, you have no security against it. That is the bargain. Theology says to you in effect, ‘Admit God and with Him the risk of a few miracles, and I in return will ratify your faith in uniformity as regards the overwhelming majority of events.” 41 If there is good evidence for a miracle, then it should be believed. It is the historian’s job to declare what is historical or possible. A philosopher can have some say about historical events but when it’s in the realm of history that the alleged miracle happened then all must yield and let the historian and historical processes do its work. If the event was a miracle, it seems that it would not only be powerful, life-changing, temporary, and so forth, as a definition of a miracle was explained to possess such properties above, but that it must also be well evidenced. Because miracles are originated and caused by a supernatural intelligence, which we all know as God, as Thomas Aquinas would say, it follows that a miracle must be in accordance with all of God’s nature, plan, and love for his creation. Therefore, a miracle must have evidence that is equal to the theological claims it makes. Thus, the greater the relevance of a miracle, the greater the evidence will be for it. The evidence doesn’t necessarily have to be quantitative in nature; rather, the quality of the evidence is in accordance with the miracle’s significance. Since the resurrection isn’t just an isolated, amazing, natural wonder that happened in Jerusalem two thousand years ago, and since it gives the deepest of existential implications for life: “Who do you say that I am,” the resurrection stands as the greatest and best attested miracle in history. Choosing from a true miracle amongst facades can now be accomplished.

Since the Enlightenment, what it means for something to be a miracle has been greatly scrutinized. With enlightened thinking, no longer were miracles needed; humanity could throw off the shackles that religion had long put on divergent interpretations. Subsequently, Antony Flew’s attack on theistic beliefs, among others, has been significant, influencing many theologians, philosophers, and historians. His arguments against religious beliefs and miracles are invalid. Flew’s falsification argument destroys itself. It is simply a self-refuting proposition. The argument that miracles are un-identifiable has an arbitrary justification for probable, improbable, and possible. The lasting impact of the argument against miracles has been that many presuppositions need to be made about reality before an investigation is begun. It also seems to go against our vast intuition and experiences that the laws of nature are generally uniform. Another avenue was left open for the theist to undercut Flew’s arguments against miracles. The theist could merely challenge the opponent of the miraculous into a historical investigation of some alleged miraculous event. Next, an evaluation of Jesus’ resurrection was considered in light of Flew’s criticism, and it was apparent that the resurrection doesn’t falter to any of Flew’s criticisms. From the very nature and definition of what a miracle is, when the evidence is weighed in relation to the existential and theological implications, the authentic miracle can be found. Thus, the evidence for the resurrection as a miracle stands. -------------------- Footnotes

1. William Lane Craig, “The Problem of Miracles: A Historical and Philosophical Perspective,” Virtual Office of William Lane Craig, 2003, available at [November 9, 2004].

2. I am acutely aware of philosophers such as Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) who believed miracles contradicted the very nature of God. He believed this because the laws of nature, he wrongly assumed, were eternal and necessitated. In other words, a miracle would contradict the very nature of God and would undoubtedly lead to atheism. Since Spinoza denied miracles because of his a priori convictions for pantheism and since the scope of this paper is not wide enough to include a discussion of his anti-super-naturalistic rejection of miracles, his views will be avoided.

3. William Lane Craig, “The Problem of Miracles: A Historical and Philosophical Perspective,” Virtual Office of William Lane Craig, 2003, available at [November 9, 2004].

4. William Lane Craig, “Contemporary Scholarship and the Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ,” Virtual Office of William Lane Craig, 2003, Available at [November 18, 2004].

5. Gerd Ludemann is perhaps the only noteworthy New Testament scholar who adheres to the hallucination theory.

6. William Lane Craig, Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? Eds. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 163.

7. Thomas V. Morris, “Philosophy and the Christian Faith,” University of Notre Dame Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 5 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 3-4, as cited in William Lane Craig, Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? Eds. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 163.

8. Actually, Flew believes that miracles are possible but holds that they are practically impossible because they are unidentifiable.

9. Antony Flew, “Theology and Falsification,” God, Freedom, and Immortality: A Critical Analysis (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1984), 74.

10. Ibid., 74.

11. Ibid., 72.

12. Ibid., 74.

13. Ibid., 74.

14. Ibid., 74.

15. Many contempory Christian apologists have argued that the problem of evil can disprove God’s existence. Similarly, if the notion of God is internally contradictory, then that would suffice as a disprove of God’s existence as well.

16. I’m not entirely sure if the falsification principle is supposed to carry over to a critique of miracles directly or in a more indirect way or if the falsification principle is actually a prelude to the attack on miracles. The falsification article that Flew wrote could also be an attack on the traditional arguments for God so his argument against miracles to get some background plausibility against miracles. Thus, Flew may be arguing against God’s existence in Falsification and Theology then taking his conclusions there as being the backbone of his Miracles article. He seems to possibly indicate this very thing in his 1984 debate with Gary Habermas.

17. I am fully aware that Flew has repudiated his atheism to a more simplistic deism. Only the future can reveal how far Flew’s search for God leads him.

18. Antony Flew, “Miracles,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Ed. Paul Edwards, (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967), 353.

19. Ibid., 351.

20. Ibid., 349.

21. Ibid., 347.

22. Ibid., 351.

23. Ibid., 353.

24. Norman Geisler, ed., Baker’s Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 256.

25. Antony Flew, ed., A Dictionary of Philosophy, Revised, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 234.

26. Norman Geisler, ed., Baker’s Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 257.

27. The cosmological argument has found its best representative in William Lane Craig. Craig has published widely on this argument.

28. William Lane Craig, “Visions of Jesus: A Critical Assessment of Gerd Lüdemann's Hallucination Hypothesis,” Virtual Office of William Lane Craig, 2003, available at [November 17,2004]

29. Gary Habermas and Antony Flew, “Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?” The Resurrection Debate, Ed. Terry L. Miethe. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), 84.

30. Ibid., 84.

31. Ibid., 84.

32. William Lane Craig, “Contemporary Scholarship and the Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ,” Virtual Office of William Lane Craig, 2003, Available at [November 18, 2004].

33. William Lane Craig, Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? Eds. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 174.

34. Ibid., 48.

35. E. Earle Ellis, ed., “The Gospel of Luke,” New Century Bible (KibdibL Beksibm, 1966), 273, as cited in William Lane Craig, Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? Eds. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 48.

36. William Lane Craig, Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? Eds. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 180.

37. Ibid., 181.

38. Gary Habermas and Antony Flew, “Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?” The Resurrection Debate, Ed. Terry L. Miethe. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), 53.

39. William Lane Craig, Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? Eds. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 181.

40. C.D. Broad, “Hume’s Theory of the Credibility of Miracles,” Proceedings from the Aristotelian Society 17. 1916-17, as cited in Josh McDowell, The New Evidence That Demands a Verdict (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishing, 1999), 669.

41. C.S. Lewis, Miracles, (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 109.

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